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Abstract 
We used a mathematical modelling approach, based on a sample of 2,019 participants, to 
better understand what the cognitive reflection test (CRT, Frederick, 2005) measures. This 
test, which is typically completed in less than ten minutes, contains three problems, and aims 
to measure the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind. 
However, since the test contains three mathematical based problems, it is possible that the 
test only measures mathematical abilities and not cognitive reflection. We found that the 
models that included an inhibition parameter (i.e., the probability of inhibiting an intuitive 
response), as well as a mathematical parameter (i.e., the probability of using an adequate 
mathematical procedure), fitted the data better than a model that only included a 
mathematical parameter. We also found that the inhibition parameter in males is best 
explained by both rational thinking ability and the disposition towards actively open-minded 
thinking, whereas in females this parameter was better explained by rational thinking only. 
With these findings this study contributes to the understanding of the processes involved in 
solving CRT, and will be particularly useful for researchers who are considering using this 
test in their research. 
 
Keywords: cognitive reflection test, actively open-minded thinking, rational thinking, 
thinking dispositions, mathematical ability  
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Does the cognitive reflection test measure cognitive reflection? A mathematical modelling 
approach 
The cognitive reflection test (CRT) was presented by Frederick (2005) with the 
purpose of measuring the construct cognitive reflection, which he defined as “the ability or 
disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind” (Frederick, 2005, p. 35). 
As shown in Table 1 CRT contains three mathematical problems with the common feature 
that they all typically trigger a quick, intuitive response, which is not the correct answer. If 
the test taker realises that the intuitive response is not the correct answer, finding the correct 
solution requires relatively easy mathematical computations. Typically, a participant either 
solves a problem incorrectly or correctly within a few minutes. Research has shown that 
people find it difficult to solve these problems, and that those who perform well at CRT tend 
to perform well at numeracy tests, other general ability tests, and tend to avoid biases in 
judgement and decision making tasks (e.g., Campitelli & Labollita, 2010; Cokely & Kelley, 
2009; Frederick, 2005; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2011; Oechssler, Roider, & 
Schmitz, 2009; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011).  
Frederick’s definition of cognitive reflection is intriguing because it encompasses the 
possibility that cognitive reflection is a thinking disposition. As noted by Toplak et al. (2011) 
thinking dispositions are typically measured with subjective reports, which are not always 
reliable (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). CRT is a performance measure with an objective 
criterion. Thus, if the CRT, indeed, measures a thinking disposition it would constitute a 
substantial progress in measuring thinking dispositions.  
Researchers seem to disagree in whether CRT measures an ability or both an ability 
and a disposition. Cokely and Kelley (2009) associated CRT with reflectiveness or “careful, 
thorough and elaborative –but not necessarily normative– cognition” (Cokeley & Kelley, 
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2009, p.27). Campitelli and Labollita (2010) proposed that cognitive reflection is not only an 
ability or disposition to veto a prepotent response, but also an ability or disposition to initiate 
cognitive processes. Moreover, in line with Cokely and Kelly, they proposed that “cognitive 
reflection, as measured by CRT, is related to Baron’s (2008) broader concept of actively-open 
minded thinking.” (Campitelli & Labollita, 2010, p. 188), and they suggested that the 
relationship between CRT and actively open-minded thinking (AOT) could be studied using 
Stanovich and West’s (1998) AOT scale. Given that AOT is a thinking disposition Cokely 
and Kelley (2009), and Campitelli and Labollita (2010) seem to favour the view that CRT not 
only measures an ability, but also a thinking disposition. 
Another group of researchers seem to view CRT as a measure of an ability (not a 
disposition), but they consider this ability as distinct from general cognitive abilities (e.g., 
intelligence, working memory). Toplak et al. (2011) referred to this ability as rational 
thinking. These authors studied the relationship between CRT and the AOT scale, among 
other measures, and found a significant but weak relationship (r = .10). Therefore, they 
discarded the possibility that CRT measures a thinking disposition. Instead, they proposed 
that CRT directly measures rational thinking ability or, negatively framed, “the tendency 
toward the class of reasoning error that derives from miserly processing” (Toplak et al., 2011, 
p. 1284). Toplak et al. used a range of measures of rational thinking ability, including 
syllogistic reasoning with belief bias (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983), and a number of 
problems used in the heuristics-and-biases literature. They showed a unique covariance 
between CRT and rational thinking that cannot be accounted for by measures of general 
cognitive ability (e.g., WASI). This “miserly processing” view is consistent with Frederick’s 
(2005) explanation of performance in CRT based on Kahneman and Frederick’s (2002) dual-
system account. People tend to use their System 1, which is quick, intuitive and heuristic, and 
fail to use their System 2, which is slow, reflective and rule based. Using a default-
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interventionist conception of System 2 (Evans, 2008), Frederick (2005) explains errors in 
CRT by the failure of System 2 to monitor or override System 1’s functioning. Böckenholt 
(2012) implemented a mathematical model entitled “cognitive-miser response model”, which 
also favours the explanation of CRT as a measure of cognitive miserliness. Liberali et al. 
(2011) evaluated Campitelli and Labollita’s (2010) proposal that CRT measures an aspect of 
AOT (i.e., the disposition to search for alternatives), and concluded that the search for 
alternatives is not enough to solve the CRT problems. An ability to inhibit and edit the wrong 
responses is also required.  
Although researchers disagree in whether CRT measures solely an ability, or both an 
ability and a thinking disposition, most of them agree that CRT is not just a test of 
mathematical ability. This agreement is based on the consensus that CRT problems, unlike 
other mathematical problems, trigger an automatic response, which is then inhibited or not, 
and only if inhibition is successful would individuals use their mathematical knowledge to 
solve the problems. This view received some support in Liberali et al.’s (2011) study, in 
which a factor analysis was conducted with a set of items including the three CRT problems 
and other mathematical problems. The authors found that the CRT problems tended to form a 
factor separated from the other problems. In contrast, Weller, Dieckmann, Tusler, Mertz, 
Burns and Peters (2013) included two CRT problems within their numeracy scale, and 
discussed the CRT within a section entitled “Existing measures of numeracy”. Thus, they 
implied that CRT is just a test of mathematical ability. 
Summing up, there are three distinct views on what CRT measures: 
 CRT is just a measure of mathematical ability 
 CRT is a measure of mathematical ability and rational thinking 
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 CRT is a measure of mathematical ability, rational thinking and the disposition 
towards actively open-minded thinking 
The goal of this article is to investigate in depth the structure of CRT and help 
determine which of these views is better supported.  
Overview of the Present Study 
In order to assess these views we used a mathematical modelling approach, similar to 
the one used by Böckenholt (2012). The rationale for this approach is that more traditional 
analyses such as linear or logistic regression would not be able to capture the hierarchical 
structure of CRT (i.e., first there is an intuitive response, then an inhibition process, and then 
a mathematical computation process). Moreover, as discussed later, unlike the traditional 
approaches, the mathematical modelling approach affords us the possibility of identifying 
gender and specific problem differences in estimated parameters (i.e., probability of 
inhibition of a prepotent response, and probability of using an appropriate mathematical 
procedure). 
We developed one mathematical model for each of the views presented in the 
introduction, as well as a null model, and then we analysed how well each model fit the data. 
Given that there are gender differences in CRT we conducted separate analyses in males and 
females. Moreover, in order to investigate the differences between CRT problems, we 
conducted both an analysis of the CRT as a whole, and an analysis of each of the problems 
independently. 
Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
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 After obtaining ethical approval from Edith Cowan University’s Ethics committee we 
used the services of MyOpinions (www.myopinions.com.au), a company that provides access 
to a panel of 360,000 Australians. These persons register into a website and participate in 
surveys as part of a reward system. Quotas were established to assure that the distribution of 
the sample in the variables gender and age was not very different from that of the Australian 
population. After the survey was launched it took approximately 10 days to obtain 2,019 
responses online (47.2% [952] were female). The average age of the sample was M = 39.8, 
SD = 11.5, range = 20-61. 18.8% of the sample did not complete secondary school, 17.7% 
completed secondary school, 30.8% obtained tertiary or trade qualification, 26.9% obtained 
an undergraduate certificate or a bachelor degree, and 5.8% obtained a master or doctoral 
degree.  
Material 
 The participants completed a survey containing questions about financial behaviour 
and questions assessing psychological variables. In this study we focussed on the 
psychological variables only. Specifically, we examined: the questions that comprise the 
CRT; those that examined numeracy (NUM) as a measure of mathematical ability; syllogistic 
reasoning with belief bias (SRBB) as a measure of rational thinking ability; and actively 
open-minded thinking (AOT) as the disposition towards actively open-minded thinking. 
Table 1 presents the CRT, and Appendix 1 (in Supplementary Materials) shows the numeracy 
problems, the syllogisms with belief bias, and the items of the open-minded thinking scale.  
Cognitive reflection test 
 The CRT (see Table 1) contains three problems. There is no time limit to solve the 
problems, and no alternatives are provided to the participants to choose from. The total score 
was the number of problems solved correctly. We also classified the responses of the 
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participants in each problem as “correct answer”, “intuitive answer” (i.e., the answer that 
corresponds to the expected quick, intuitive response that first comes to mind; see Table 1), 
and “other answer”.   
Numeracy 
 To measure numeracy we used the three more difficult problems (as reported by 
Peters & Levin, 2008) of the 11-item numeracy scale developed by Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer 
(2001). Problem 2 differed from the original question in that we provided six alternatives to 
the participants. Problems 1 and 3 did not have alternatives. The total score was the number 
of items solved correctly. The numeracy items are presented in Appendix 1. 
Syllogistic reasoning with belief bias 
 We constructed four “incongruent” syllogisms in which the conclusion followed 
logically from the premises but contradicted a belief (e.g., Australia Stock Exchange (ASX) 
always goes up), or the conclusion did not follow logically from the premises but were 
consistent with a belief (e.g., Visa is a credit card). We constructed these syllogisms based on 
Sá, West, and Stanovich (1999), who, in turn, used syllogisms presented in Markovits and 
Nantel (1989).  Following Stanovich and West (1998), Macpherson and Stanovich (2007), 
West, Toplak and Stanovich (2008) and Toplak et al. (2011) we used the total number of 
incongruent syllogisms correctly solved as a measure of the ability to avoid belief bias
i
. To 
ensure consistency and clarity with the literature, we refer to this variable as syllogistic 
reasoning with belief bias (SRBB); and, based on Toplak et al.’s (2011) classification, we 
used this variable as a measure of rational thinking. The syllogisms are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
Actively open-minded thinking 
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 Baron (1985, 2008) used the term actively open-minded thinking to refer to thinking 
that includes thorough search relative to the importance of a question, confidence according 
to the amount and quality of thinking carried out, and consideration of alternatives different 
to the one we initially favour. Stanovich and West (2007) used a 41-item Actively Open-
Minded Thinking scale that evolved from previous scales: flexible thinking scale (Stanovich 
& West, 1997), openness-values facet of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992), dogmatism (Paulhus & Reid, 1991), categorical thinking subscale of Epstein 
and Meier’s (1989) constructive thinking inventory, belief identification scale (Sá et al., 
1999), and counterfactual thinking scale (Stanovich & West, 1997). In order to minimise the 
chance of participant inattention we selected 15 items from the 41-item scale, based on a pilot 
study which showed that those items had the highest internal consistency. 
 Each item consisted of a statement, and the participants had to indicate whether they 
strongly agree (scored as 6), agree moderately (5), agree slightly (4), disagree slightly (3), 
disagree moderately (2), or disagree strongly (1) with the statement. The total score was 
obtained by summing the responses to the 15 items, after reversing the score of the questions 
in which disagree strongly (i.e., 1) indicated a tendency towards actively open-minded 
thinking. The scale is presented in Appendix 1. 
Analyses 
  We carried out traditional analyses (i.e., correlations and regressions) and then we 
conducted a mathematical modelling analysis. (Four scripts of code to run the mathematical 
modelling analyses in the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2012), and the dataset can be 
found in Supplementary Material or in the following link: 
https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0BxvQ-uHPASPvd3lwS2MzR3c0WlE&usp=sharing). We 
constructed four mathematical models (i.e., one for each of the views of CRT identified in the 
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introduction, and one null model), and fitted the four models to the data corresponding to the 
whole CRT. After that we fitted the same models to the data of each of the three CRT 
problems separately. Given that previous research has shown that there are gender differences 
in CRT (Frederick, 2005), we fitted the models to males and females separately. Appendix 2 
(In Supplementary Materials) presents the mathematical formulas that are common to all the 
models, and those that are model specific. It also describes the maximum likelihood 
estimation, and the model selection procedures.  
Mathematical models 
We constructed four mathematical models:  
 null model [NULL],  
 mathematical ability model [MATH],  
 rational thinking model [RAT], and  
 thinking disposition model [DISP].  
 
------------------------- INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE------------------------------ 
 
NULL assumes that CRT is not a sensitive measure, thus everyone performs 
similarly. The only estimate of performance in each participant is the mean performance of 
the sample. This implies that there is no variability in performance in CRT. This model does 
not require estimating parameters. MATH (see panel a in Figure 1) is the implementation of 
the view that CRT only measures mathematical ability. The model assumes that after reading 
the instructions the participants either perform an adequate mathematical computation with 
probability μ, and thus they produce a correct answer, or they do not produce a correct 
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mathematical computation with probability 1 – μ, and thus they give an incorrect answer (i.e., 
either intuitive or other). The mathematical expression of this model is equivalent to a 
regression analysis in which the CRT performance is predicted only by the score in the 
numeracy test.  
RAT implements the view that CRT measures mathematical ability and rational 
thinking, and DISP implements the view that CRT measures mathematical ability, rational 
thinking and a disposition towards actively open-minded thinking. Panel b in Figure 1 shows 
RAT and DISP.  These models assume that reading the instruction triggers an intuitive 
response. This response is either inhibited with probability τ, or not inhibited with probability 
1 – τ. If the response is not inhibited, then the participant reports the intuitive response as 
final answer (i.e., intuitive answer). If the response is inhibited then the participant will use 
an appropriate mathematical procedure with probability μ or use an inadequate procedure 
with probability 1 – μ. If an appropriate procedure is used then the participant gives a correct 
answer, and if not the participant gives an “other answer”, which is incorrect but different 
from the intuitive answer. In RAT the probability τ of inhibiting the intuitive response is 
estimated by SRBB, and in DISP this probability is estimated by both SRBB and AOT.   
Comparison among models 
 All the parameters were estimated by maximum likelihood estimation using the 
function optim in the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2012).  In order to select the best 
model we used the Bayesian Information Criterion formula (BIC).  In each analysis the 
model with the lowest BIC was chosen as the best model. We used Raferty’s (1995) 
interpretation of differences between BIC scores in terms of strength of evidence: BIC 
differences between 0 and 2 denote weak evidence, between 2 and 6 express positive 
evidence, between 6 and 10 strong evidence, and higher than 10 very strong evidence. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics  
 As shown in Table 2, participants produced more intuitive answers [M = 1.61, SD = 
1.04] than correct answers [M = .94, SD = 1.06] and other answers [M = .45, SD = .69] [χ2 
(2)=1,366, p < .0001]. Males [M = 1.11, SD = 1.1] gave more correct answers than women 
[M = 0.76, SD = .97] [t(2016.6) = 7.54, p < .0001, CI95 = .258, .439], and the opposite was 
true for intuitive answers [Males: M = 1.47 , SD = 1.03, Females: M = 1.77 , SD = 1.02; t 
(1997.3)= 6.46; p < .0001; CI95 = .205, .385]. No gender differences were found in the 
proportion of other answers [Males: M = .42, SD = .67; Females: M = 0.48, SD = .7; t 
(1965.8) = 1.74; p < .081; CI95 = -.007, .113].  These results are consistent with Frederick’s 
(2005) report of gender differences in the number of correct answers [Male M = 1.47, Female 
M: 1.03, p < .0001].  
--------------------------------- INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE  -------------------------- 
 The correlations of age with correct answers, intuitive errors, and other errors were 
not significant [correlation age-correct answers: r (2018) = -.007, p = .753; correlation age-
intuitive errors:  r(2018) = -.009, p = .686; correlation age-other errors r(2018) = .026, p = 
.243]. To rule out non-linear relationships between these variables we created four age groups 
(30 years or less, 40 years or less, 50 years or less, more than 50 years) and compared their 
performance in CRT. There were no age group differences in correct answers [30- group: n = 
533, M = .91, SD = 1.07; 30+ group: n = 505, M = 0.99, SD = 1.06; 40+ group: n = 545, M = 
0.95, SD = 1.06; 50+ group: n = 436, M = 0.91, SD = 1.03; F (3, 2015) = 0.6, p = .623], 
intuitive answers [30- group: M = 1.67, SD = 1.07; 30+ group: M = 1.55, SD = 1.03; 40+ 
group: M = 1.59, SD = 1.02; 50+ group: M = 1.61, SD = 1.02; F(3, 2015) = 0.6, p = .623], and 
other answers [30- group: M = .41, SD = 0.67; 30+ group: M = 0.45, SD = 0.69; 40+ group: 
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M = 0.46, SD = 0.7; 50+ group: M = 0.47, SD = 0.68; F(3, 2015) = 0.7, p = .539]. Given that 
males and females differed in the proportion of correct answers and intuitive answers, we run 
separate analyses for females and males. On the other hand, age was not related to CRT 
performance, thus we did not separate the sample in age groups. 
 We also analysed the data in all the problems separately (see Figure 2). The 
proportion of correct answers in problem 2 [M = .37, SD = .48] and problem 3 [M = .37, SD = 
.48] was much higher than that in problem 1 [M = .21, SD = .41]; and the proportion of 
intuitive answers was much higher in problem 1 [M = .74, SD = .44] than in problem 2 [M = 
.41, SD = .49] and in problem 3 [M = .47, SD = .50]. The number of other answers was higher 
in problem 2 [M = .23, SD = .42] than in problem 3 [M = .17, SD = .38] and problem 1 [M = 
.06, SD = .23]. 
 
---------------------------INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE -------------------------------------- 
 
 The pattern of gender differences remains the same in the three items. Males [problem 
1: M = .24, SD = .42; problem 2: M = .43, SD = .5; problem 3: M = .44 , SD = .5] produced a 
higher proportion of correct answers than females [problem1: M = .18, SD = .38; problem 2: 
M = .29, SD = .46; problem 3: M = .29, SD = .45] in all problems [difference between males 
and females in correct answers in problem 1: t(2016.8) = 3.2, p < .005, CI95 = .022, .093, 
problem 2: t(2015.1) = 6.47, p < .0001, CI95= .095,.179, and problem 3: t(2016.3)= 7.3, p < 
.0001, CI95 = .113, .195]. On the other hand, the proportion of intuitive answers in females 
[problem 1: M = .76, SD = .43; problem 2: M = .46, SD = .5; problem 3: M = .54, SD = .5] 
was higher than that in males [problem1: M = .71, SD = .45; problem 2: M = .36, SD = .48, 
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problem 3: M = .40, SD = .49] in all the problems [difference between males and females in 
correct answers in problem 1: t(2011.9) = 2.66, p < .005, CI95 = .014,.091, problem 2: 
t(1971.8) = 4.5, p < .0001, CI95 = .055,.141, and problem 3: t(1982.9) = 6.6, p < .0001, CI95 
= .102, .188].  
Finally, only in problem 2 were there significant differences in the proportion of other 
answers between females [problem 1: M = .06, SD = .24; problem 2: M = .25, SD = .43; 
problem 3: M = .17, SD = .38] and males [problem 1: M = .05, SD = .22; problem 2: M = .21, 
SD = .41; problem 3: M = .16, SD = .37] [difference between males and females in correct 
answers in problem 1: t(1967.1) = .53, p = .598, CI95 = -.015, .026), problem 2: t(1957.7) = 
2.08, p < .04, CI95= .002,.076, and problem 3: t(1980.4)= .55, p = .585, CI95 = -.024, .042)]. 
Given that there were differences in the behaviour of participants from problem to problem 
we fitted the models to the data of the whole CRT, and also to each problem separately. 
Internal consistency  
The Cronbach alpha in CRT was .66, which is higher than that reported in two 
previous studies –Liberali et al. (2011, study 2) = .64 and Weller et al. (2013) = .60– and 
lower than that in one study –Liberali et al. (2011, study 1) = .74. Finucane and Gullion 
(2010) obtained a higher internal consistency (α = .80), but with a different 6-item 
questionnaire, which included the three CRT items. Other studies that used CRT have not 
reported measures of its internal consistency. 
The 3-item measure of numeracy used in the present study obtained an internal 
consistency of α = .51. Using the Schwartz, Woloshin, Black and Welch’s (1997) 3-item 
scale, Finucane and Gullion (2010) obtained an internal consistency of α = .53, Weller et al. 
(2013) obtained α = .58, and Liberali et al. (2011) obtained α = .60 in study 1, and α = .44 in 
study 2. Lipkus et al.’s (2001) 11-item scale obtained a higher internal consistency [Liberali 
Cognitive Reflection Test 
15 
 
et al., study 1, α = .69, study 2, α = .59, Weller et al., α = .76], but it did not improve the 
relationship with CRT. For example, Liberali et al. obtained a somewhat higher correlation 
with CRT with the 11-item measure in study 2 (11-item r = .39, 3-item r = .37), but 
somewhat lower in study 1 (11-item r = .51, 3-item r = .55). Finucane and Gullion also 
justified the use of a 3-item scale because it is moderately correlated with 11-item scales and 
reduces participant burden. 
The SRBB measure used in this study obtained an internal consistency of α = .61. We 
are not aware of studies reporting internal consistency on this type of task. On average the 
participants in our sample answered half of the syllogisms correctly [2.07 out of 4], which is 
consistent with previous studies [e.g., Stanovich & West (1998) = 4.4 out of 8, West et al. 
(2008) = 6.9 out of 12, Toplak et al. (2011) = 2.72 out of 5]. 
Finally, our decision to reduce the AOT scale to 15 items in the present study appears 
to be justified because its reliability (α = .85) was slightly higher than that obtained by Toplak 
et al. (2011) with 41 items (α =.81) and West et al. (2008) (α = .84). Moreover, as presented 
in the next section, the correlation with numeracy and with SRBB was higher than in 
previous studies. 
Traditional analyses 
Before presenting the results of the mathematical modelling analyses we discuss the 
relationship between variables in a more traditional fashion. Table 3 shows the correlations 
between the measures used in the present study, including each of the CRT problems, as well 
as overall CRT. The correlations among CRT problems range from .35 to .42, and that of the 
CRT problems with overall CRT range from .73 to .80.  
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------------------------------------- INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE --------------------------- 
 
 We obtained a significant (r = .43) correlation between CRT and numeracy. This is 
consistent with previous studies –Cokely and Kelley (2009), r = .31; Liberali et al. (2011), r 
ranged from .37 to .51; Finucane and Gullion (2010), r = .53; Weller et al. (2013), r = .43. 
Moreover, like Toplak et al. (2011), we obtained a significant correlation of CRT with SRBB 
[this study: r = .43; Toplak et al.: r = .36], and with AOT [this study: r = .25; Toplak et al.: r 
= .10]. Then, we regressed the overall CRT score to the three covariates. Given that CRT and 
gender are correlated, we separately estimated a regression for males and another one for 
females. As shown in Table 4 and Table 5, a standard deviation change in numeracy accounts 
for almost a third of a standard deviation in CRT both in males and in females, and the same 
applies to SRBB. Moreover, a standard deviation change in AOT accounts for a .12 standard 
deviation change in CRT in males, and .08 in females. Although the contribution of AOT to 
predict CRT is modest, it is still statistically significant in both cases.  
To further check whether the cognitive measures have explanatory power of CRT 
response classification (correct, intuitive and other) a multinomial logistic regression was 
estimated for each of the three CRT questions with the three cognitive measures as 
explanatory variables (results not tabulated). For the individual problems the Cragg-Uhler R
2
 
was 0.212, 0.143, and 0.307 for problems one, two, and three, respectively. Thus the three 
cognitive measures account for CRT response classification. 
 
-------------------- INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE ------------------------------------------ 
--------------------INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE ------------------------------------------ 
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This initial analysis suggests that CRT has a strong mathematical and rational 
thinking component, and that the contribution of disposition towards actively open-minded 
thinking is weaker, but still important and significant. It also indicates that the relationship 
between the predictor variables and each of the CRT problems is significant, but the amount 
of variance accounted for varies among problems. Moreover, there are gender differences in 
CRT performance.  
The mathematical modelling analyses will afford us the possibility to investigate the 
structure of CRT in more depth. Based on the results of this initial analysis, we not only 
conducted a mathematical modelling analysis in the whole CRT, but also in each problem. 
Moreover, we conducted the analyses in males and females, separately. 
Mathematical modelling results 
Table 6, 7, 8 and 9 show the best estimate of the probability of using an accurate 
mathematical procedure (µ), that of the probability of inhibiting the intuitive response (τ), and 
the odd ratios given a 1 standard deviation change in the three covariates. The log-likelihood, 
deviance and BIC of each model are also presented. Table 6 presents the results 
corresponding to the whole CRT analysis, and Tables 7, 8, and 9 show the results 
corresponding to the analysis of problem 1, problem 2 and problem 3, respectively. 
--------------------------------- INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE  -------------------------- 
--------------------------------- INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE  -------------------------- 
--------------------------------- INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE  -------------------------- 
--------------------------------- INSERT TABLE 9 AROUND HERE  -------------------------- 
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 In all the analyses NULL was the worst model. This indicates that MATH, RAT and 
DISP are able to account for some of the individual differences in CRT beyond and above 
chance. In all cases the difference in BIC between NULL and each of the other models was 
much greater than 10; that is, this is very strong evidence (Raferty, 1995). The same result 
was found in the three problems analysed separately. Note that, in RAT and DISP, µ is 
conditional on τ. In other words, it is the probability of using an appropriate mathematical 
procedure given that the intuitive response has been inhibited. That is why the values of µ in 
those models are much higher than those of the MATH models. The odd ratios for Num in all 
tables can be interpreted as the increase in odds of using an appropriate mathematical 
procedure given a 1 standard deviation change in numeracy. The odd ratios for SRBB and 
AOT in all tables reflect the increase in odds of inhibiting the intuitive response given a 1 
standard deviation change in SRBB and AOT, respectively. An odds ratio of 1 indicates no 
change whereas an odds ratio of 2 indicates a 100% change or indicates that the odds are 
doubled. The numeracy odds ratios range from 2.75 to 4.45 change. This confirms that 
mathematical ability is very important to solve the CRT problems. The odds ratios for SRBB 
suggest this variable is also important given that they range from 1.15 to 1.17. The AOT odds 
ratios are lower, ranging from 1.08 to 1.36. 
 The critical comparisons to test the hypothesis that CRT is merely a mathematical test 
are MATH vs. RAT, and MATH vs. DISP. Both the male and female whole CRT analyses 
provided very strong evidence (BIC difference > 10) in favour of RAT and DISP over 
MATH. Therefore, CRT is not just another numeracy test.  
The critical comparison to determine whether CRT measures only rational thinking or 
both rational thinking and the thinking disposition toward actively open-minded thinking is 
between RAT and DISP. In females, the whole CRT analysis provided very strong evidence 
of RAT over DISP. On the other hand, in males there was very strong evidence in favour of 
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DISP over RAT. These results suggest that the disposition toward actively open-minded 
thinking did not play a significant role in solving the CRT test in females, but it did play an 
important role in males.  
 In the individual problem analyses the evidence in favour of RAT or DISP over 
MATH was very strong in problems 1 and 3, and positive (BIC difference = 3.5) in problem 
2 in males. In females, there was very strong evidence in favour of RAT or DISP over 
MATH in problems 1 and 3, whereas there was strong evidence (BIC difference = 7.4) in 
favour of MATH in problem 2. These results suggest that problem 2 is “more mathematical” 
than the others.  
 In the RAT vs. DISP comparison, there was positive to strong evidence in favour of 
RAT in females in problems 1 and 3 (Note that, given that in problem 2 MATH was the best 
model, the RAT vs. DISP comparison is irrelevant). In males, problems 2 and 3 provided 
weak and very strong evidence, respectively, in favour of DISP. However, in problem 1 the 
evidence was in favour of RAT.  
Discussion 
 We presented three views on what CRT measures: a mathematical ability (MATH 
model); both a mathematical ability and rational thinking ability (RAT model); or a 
mathematical ability, rational thinking ability and a disposition towards actively open-minded 
thinking (DISP model). The results clearly show that CRT is not just a mathematical test. 
However, the results do not provide clear-cut evidence to differentiate between the other two 
views. The overall CRT analysis showed strong evidence in favour of DISP over RAT in 
males, but the opposite was true in females. Both models contain the μ parameter (i.e., 
probability of using adequate mathematical procedures) and the τ parameter (i.e., probability 
of inhibiting the intuitive response). The difference between these models resides in how the τ 
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parameter is estimated. In RAT only a rational thinking variable is used (i.e., the ability to 
avoid belief biases), whereas DISP also uses a thinking disposition (i.e., actively open-
minded thinking) to estimate τ. Thus, this result indicates that there is very strong evidence in 
favour of the conception of CRT as a test that measures mathematical abilities, rational 
thinking and disposition toward actively open-mind thinking in males, and mathematical 
abilities and rational thinking in females.  
 The values of the estimated parameters provide very useful information. The average 
probability of inhibiting the intuitive response (i.e., τ) was .510 in males and .412 in females, 
in the whole CRT analysis. This gender difference was apparent in all the problems. The 
average values of τ in males in the best fitting model were .289, .640, and .599, in problems 
1, 2, and 3, respectively. The same pattern was observed in females: .237, .542, and .456. 
These results suggest that females found it more difficult to inhibit the intuitive response. 
Moreover, the inhibition of the intuitive response was more difficult in the first problem. 
Given that the order of the problems was not counterbalanced in this study because the CRT 
has a specified sequence of problems, it remains to be established whether this difficulty 
arises as a consequence of idiosyncratic characteristics of problem 1 or due to a learning 
effect (i.e., participants got better at inhibiting the intuitive response in problems 2 and 3). 
 Parameter μ also showed gender and problem differences. In the best fitting models 
the average estimate in males was .685 for the whole CRT, and .748, .657, and .677 for 
problems 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In females the average μ was .572 for the whole CRT, and 
.654, .532, and .563, for problems 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Interestingly, μ was higher in 
problem 1 than in the other problems both in males and females. This suggests that in 
problem 1 it is very difficult to inhibit the intuitive answer (i.e., low τ), but if one is able to 
inhibit it, then the problem becomes relatively easy (i.e., high μ). 
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 One possible explanation of this finding is the following. When people try to solve all 
the CRT problems, they tend to use a heuristic representation of the problem instead of a 
representation using mathematical formulae. The bat and ball problem (problem 1) differs 
from the others in that, if the intuitive answer is inhibited, people can still use the same 
representation to solve it correctly, whereas this is not possible with the other problems, 
which require the use of some formal mathematical procedure. For example, when people 
read “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total” they may represent the problem as a bat on the left 
hand side and the ball in the right hand side, and both above a line that goes from $0.00 to 
$1.10 (and with a marker at $1). When they then read “The bat costs $1.00 more than the 
ball” they (wrongly) increase the size of the bat until the $1.00 mark and “squeeze” the ball to 
the region between $1.00 and $1.10. Finally, when they read “How much does the ball cost?” 
they immediately respond $0.10 based on their representation. However, if they realised that 
in this solution the bat does not cost $1.00 more than the ball, they can still use this 
representation to get the correct answer. They can increase the size of the region of the bat 
(and squeeze the size of the region of the ball) until the bat reaches a prize that is $1 higher 
than that of the ball.  
 The present results are consistent with those of Frederick (2005), Campitelli and 
Labollita (2010), Liberali et al. (2011), Toplak et al. (2011), and Böckenholt (2012). All these 
studies, using different approaches, arrived at the conclusion that the CRT is not just a 
measure of general skills (specifically, mathematical ability), and that it measures something 
above and beyond general skills (i.e., cognitive reflection).  
  Campitelli and Labollita’s (2010) and Cokely and Kelley’s (2009) suggestion 
that the CRT measures the thinking disposition called actively open-minded thinking (Baron, 
1985, 2008) received partial support in this study. In males, the model that incorporated 
mathematical ability, rational thinking and the disposition towards actively open-minded 
Cognitive Reflection Test 
22 
 
thinking was the best model. On the other hand, in females the model that included 
mathematical ability and rational thinking (but not thinking dispositions) was the best model. 
Limitations of this study 
 The numeracy and belief bias measures were calculated over 3 and 4 items, 
respectively. Using scales with a larger number of items may have increased the 
discrimination value of the scales. Moreover, for the same reason, CRT itself may be in need 
of a larger scale. Indeed, S. Frederick (personal communication, October 12, 2012) is 
currently developing a 10-item version of CRT. Having 10 items may strike a balance 
between length of test and the discriminative value of the test. This weakness should be 
considered in the context of the strengths of this study. We used a very large sample of more 
than 2,000 participants; therefore, this study had enough power to capture small effects.  
Conclusion  
 Our data suggests that performance in the CRT in females is accounted for by their 
abilities (both mathematical and rational thinking abilities), but not by their disposition 
towards actively open-minded thinking. On the other hand, performance in the CRT in males 
is accounted for by their abilities and by their disposition towards actively open-minded 
thinking.  In both cases the results indicate that CRT is, indeed, a test of cognitive reflection, 
and not just a numeracy test. 
 The mathematical modelling approach provided more information than typical 
statistical analyses. We were able to estimate a parameter for the probability of inhibiting the 
intuitive response, and a parameter for the probability of using adequate mathematical 
procedures. This analysis suggests that gender differences are related to both parameters. 
Additionally, this approach showed parameter differences between problems. This 
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information is very useful in view of current attempts to improve the discrimination of the 
test. Ideally, one should choose problems (like problem 1) with a low probability of inhibition 
and a high probability of using adequate mathematical procedures. In this way, the cognitive 
reflection component of the test would be more important than the mathematical component 
of the test.  
 CRT is a very easily administered psychological test. We believe that this study 
contributes to the understanding of what CRT actually measures. By doing this, we hope that 
this study provides valuable information for researchers to decide whether, and in what 
situations, to use the CRT. 
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Table 1. Cognitive Reflection Test with correct and intuitive answers 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? _____ cents. [Correct = 5 cents; Intuitive = 10 cents] 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines 
to make 100 widgets? _____ minutes [Correct = 5 minutes; Intuitive = 100 minutes] 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half 
of the lake? _____ days [Correct = 47 days; Intuitive = 24 days] 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics: Cognitive reflection correct answers, intuitive answers and other answers (CRT correct, CRT intuitive, 
CRTother), Numeracy, syllogistic reasoning with belief bias (SRBB), and actively open-minded thinking (AOT). 
 
 
 
 
Note. 
**** 
= p < 
.0001
, † = non-significant, M = mean, SD = standard deviation, 95% CI = 95% confidence interval, t = Welch t test, df = degrees of freedom,  AOT = 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking. 
  
    
Gender 
  
 
All Participants (n = 2019) Male (n = 1,067) Female (n = 952) Comparison 
Variable M  SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI M  SD 95% CI t  df 
CRT correct 0.94 1.06 .90, .99 1.11 1.1 1.04, 1.17 0.76 0.97 .70, .82 7.54**** 2016.6 
CRT intuitive 1.61 1.04 1.56, 1.65 1.47 1.03 1.41, 1.53 1.77 1.02 1.70, 1.83 6.46**** 1997.3 
CRT other 0.45 0.69 .42, .48 0.42 0.67 .38, .46 0.48 0.7 .43, .52 1.74† 1965.8 
Numeracy 1.97 0.99 1.93, 2.01 2.07 0.98 2.01, 2.13 1.86 0.98 1.79, 1.92 4.87**** 1990.6 
SRBB 2.07 1.26 2.01, 2.12 2.1 1.29 2.02, 2.17 2.04 1.22 1.96, 2.12 1.01† 2011.2 
AOT 62.27 11.44 61.77, 62.77 61.11 11.72 60.41, 61.81 63.58 10.99 62.88, 64.28 4.88**** 2011.9 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
  age crt crt1 crt2 crt3 num srbb aot 
gender .07* .16** .07* .14** .16** .11** .02 -.11** 
age 
 
-.01 -.05* .05* -.02 -.12** -.09** .00 
crt 
  
.73** .78** .80** .43** .43** .25** 
crt1 
   
.35** .41** .30** .30** .17** 
crt2 
    
.42** .28** .27** .16** 
crt3 
     
.41** .40** .24** 
num 
      
.30** .23** 
srbb               .28** 
M 39.8 .94 .21 .37 .37 1.97 2.07 62.3 
SD 11.5 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 1 1.3 11.4 
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Table 4. Prediction of overall CRT performance. Females. 
  B SE β t p 
Constant -.736 .160 
 
-4.6 <.001 
Numeracy .298 .029 .302 10.1 <.001 
SRBB .231 .024 .290 9.7 <.001 
AOT .007 .003 .083 2.8 <.006 
 
R
2
 = .263  
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Table 5. Prediction of overall CRT performance. Males. 
  B SE β t p 
Constant -.889 .152 
 
-5.9 <.001 
Numeracy .343 .030 .305 11.3 <.001 
SRBB .272 .023 .319 11.6 <.001 
AOT .012 .003 .124 4.6 <.001 
 
R
2
 = .309  
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Table 6. Estimated probabilities, odds ratios, and goodness of fit measures in each model as a function of gender, for the whole CRT. 
    
Overall CRT 
   
 
Males Females 
Parameters  NULL MATH RAT DISP NULL MATH RAT DISP 
μ 
 
.369 (.16) .685 (.20) .685 (.20) 
 
.252 (.14) .572 (.20) .572 (.20) 
Num 
 
2.24 2.67 2.67 
 
2.32 2.52 2.52 
τ 
  
.510 (.13) .510 (.13) 
  
.412 (.11) .412 (.11) 
SRBB 
  
1.69 1.61 
  
1.60 1.56 
AOT       1.21       1.10 
Log-lik -2378.2 -2189.4 -2141.1 -2129.4 -2028 -1879.6 -1853.5 -1850.8 
Deviance 4756.4 4378.9 4282.2 4258.8 4056.1 3759.1 3706.9 3701.6 
BIC 4756.4 4392.8 4310.1 4293.6 4056.1 3772.9 3734.4 3753.9 
Note. μ denotes the probability of using adequate mathematical procedures. (Note that in RAT and DISP μ  refers to the probability of using 
adequate mathematical procedures given that inhibition of intuitive response occurred.) τ refers to the probability of inhibiting the intuitive 
response. The table shows the odds ratio as a function of a change in 1 SD in numeracy (num), syllogistic reasoning with belief bias (SRBB), 
and actively open-minded thinking (AOT) for each model. Log-lik = Log Likelihood, BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion. 
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Table 7. Estimated probabilities, odds ratios, and goodness of fit measures in each model as a function of gender, for CRT problem 1. 
 
CRT problem 1 
 
Males Females 
Parameters  NULL MATH RAT DISP NULL MATH RAT DISP 
μ  .236 (.12) .748 (.22) .748 (.22)  .179 (.13) .654 (.27) .654 (.27) 
Num  2.26 3.41 3.41  3.15 4.45 4.45 
τ   .290 (.13) .290 (.13)   .237 (.12) .237 (.12) 
SRBB   1.91 1.85   2.00 1.97 
AOT       1.11       1.08 
Log-lik -789.8 -744.3 -720.9 -719.9 -648.3 -588.3 -574 -573.7 
Deviance 1579.7 1488.6 1441.9 1439.8 1296.6 1176.6 1148.1 1147.3 
BIC 1579.7 1502.6 1469.8 1474.7 1296.6 1190.3 1175.5 1181.6 
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Table 8. Estimated probabilities, odds ratios, and goodness of fit measures in each model as a function of gender, for CRT problem 2. 
CRT problem 2 
 
Males Females 
Parameters  NULL MATH RAT DISP NULL MATH RAT DISP 
μ  .431 (.15) .657 (.17) .657 (.17)  .294 (.11) .533 (.16) .533 (.16) 
Num  1.92 2.13 2.13  1.75 1.95 1.95 
τ   .640 (.08) .640 (.09)   .542 (.04) .542 (.05) 
SRBB 
  
1.44 1.36 
  
1.19 1.15 
AOT       1.22       1.12 
Log-lik -1128.6 -1080.3 -1072.4 -1068.1 -1012.3 -985.2 -982 -980.6 
Deviance 2257.1 2160 2144.8 2136.1 2024.6 1970.4 1964 1961.2 
BIC 2257.1 2174.5 2172.6 2171 2024.6 1984.1 1991.5 1995.5 
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Table 9. Estimated probabilities, odds ratios, and goodness of fit measures in each model as a function of gender, for CRT problem 3. 
 
 
CRT problem 3 
 
Males Females 
Parameters  NULL MATH RAT DISP NULL MATH RAT DISP 
μ  .439 (.22) .677 (.23) .677 (.23)  .285 (.17) .563 (.22) .564 (.22) 
Num  2.93 3.24 3.24  2.81 2.75 2.75 
τ   .600 (.17) .599 (.18)   .456 (.17) .456 (.17) 
SRBB 
  
2.17 2.01   2.11 2.05 
AOT      1.36    1.17 
Log-lik -1091.6 -981.6 -957.6 -948 -943.4 -868.4 -845.8 -844.7 
Deviance 2183.2 1963.1 1915.2 1896 1886.8 1736.7 1691.6 1689.4 
BIC 2183.2 1977.1 1943.1 1930.9 1886.8 1750.4 1719.1 1723.7 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the models. Panel a shows the MATH model, where μ 
stands for the probability of using an accurate mathematical procedure. Panel b shows a 
representation of the RAT and DISP models. The difference between these models is that in 
DISP both SRBB and AOT are used as covariates to estimate the probability of inhibition (τ), 
and in RAT only SRBB is used. 
Figure 2. Proportion of type of answers for males and females in (a) CRT problem 1, (b) CRT 
problem 2, and (c) CRT problem 3. 
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Figure 1 
a) 
 
 
b) 
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Figure 2. 
a)       b) 
    
c) 
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i
 We thank the Associate Editor for indicating that the difference score (i.e., the difference 
between the number of correct congruent syllogisms and the number of correct incongruent 
syllogisms) removes variability due to general ability. Therefore, although Macpherson and 
Stanovich (2007) indicated that the number of correct incongruent syllogisms is a more 
reliable measure than difference score, in future research reporting both measures would be 
more informative. Unfortunately, based on previous literature, we did not collect data on 
congruent syllogisms, thus we cannot report both measures here. 
